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Abstract
We provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identi￿cation region of the parameters
￿ in a broad class of incomplete econometric models. Models in this class have set valued
predictions that yield a convex set of conditional or unconditional moments for the observable
model variables. In short, we call these models with convex moment predictions. Examples
include static, simultaneous move ￿nite games of complete and incomplete information in the
presence of multiple equilibria; best linear predictors with interval outcome and covariate data;
and random utility models of multinomial choice in the presence of interval regressors data.
Given a candidate value for ￿; we establish that the convex set of moments yielded by the model
predictions can be represented as the Aumann expectation of a properly de￿ned random set.
The sharp identi￿cation region of ￿; denoted ￿I; can then be obtained as the set of minimizers
of the distance from a properly speci￿ed vector of moments of random variables to this Aumann
expectation. Algorithms in convex programming can be exploited to e¢ ciently verify whether
a candidate ￿ is in ￿I: We use examples analyzed in the literature to illustrate the gains in
identi￿cation and computational tractability a⁄orded by our method.
Keywords: Partial Identi￿cation, Random Sets, Aumann Expectation, Support Function, Fi-
nite Static Games, Multiple Equilibria, Random Utility Models, Interval Data, Best Linear
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Overview. This paper provides a simple, novel, and computationally feasible procedure to deter-
mine the sharp identi￿cation region of the parameters ￿ characterizing a broad class of incomplete
econometric models. Models in this class have set valued predictions which yield a convex set of
conditional or unconditional moments for the model observable variables. In short, throughout the
paper, we call these models with convex moment predictions. Our use of the term ￿model￿encom-
passes econometric frameworks ranging from structural semi-parametric models, to non-parametric
best predictors under square loss. In the interest of clarity of exposition, in this paper we focus
on the semi-parametric case. We exemplify our methodology applying it to static, simultaneous
move ￿nite games of complete and incomplete information in the presence of multiple equilibria;
and best linear predictors with interval outcome and covariate data.1
Models with convex moment predictions can be described as follows. For a given value of the
parameter vector ￿ and realization of (a subset of) model variables, the economic model predicts
a set of values for a vector of variables of interest. These are the model set valued predictions,
which are not necessarily convex. No restriction is placed on the manner in which, in the data
generating process, a speci￿c model prediction is selected from this set. When the researcher takes
conditional expectations of the resulting elements of this set, the unrestricted process of selection
yields a convex set of moments for the model variables￿this is the model￿ s convex set of moment
predictions. If this set were almost surely single valued, the researcher would be able to identify ￿ by
matching the model-implied vector of moments to the one observed in the data. When the model￿ s
moment predictions are set valued, one may ￿nd many values for the parameter vector ￿ which,
when coupled with speci￿c selection mechanisms picking one of the model set valued predictions,
generate the same conditional expectation as the one observed in the data. Each of these values
of ￿ is observationally equivalent, and the question becomes how to characterize the collection of
observationally equivalent ￿￿ s in a tractable manner.
Although previous literature has provided tractable characterizations of the sharp identi￿cation
region for certain models with convex moment predictions (see, e.g. Manski (2003) for the analysis
of nonparametric best predictors under square loss with interval outcome data), there exist many
important problems, including the examples analyzed in this paper, in which such a characterization
1When thinking about best linear prediction (BLP), no ￿model￿is assumed in any substantive sense. However,
with some abuse of terminology, for a given value of the BLP parameter vector ￿; we refer to the set of prediction
errors associated with each logically possible outcome and covariate variables in the observable random intervals, as
the ￿model set valued predictions.￿In the Supplement to this paper, Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2010b),
we also analyze random utility models of multinomial choice in the presence of interval regressors data.
1is di¢ cult to obtain. The analyses of Horowitz, Manski, Ponomareva, and Stoye (2003, HMPS
henceforth), and Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004, ABJ henceforth) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009,
CT henceforth), are examples of research studying, respectively, the identi￿ed features of best
linear predictors with missing outcome and covariate data, and ￿nite games with multiple pure
strategy Nash equilibria. HMPS provide sharp identi￿cation regions, but these may have prohibitive
computational cost. In order to make progress not only on identi￿cation analysis but also on ￿nite
sample inference, ABJ and CT propose regions of parameter values which are not sharp.
Establishing whether a conjectured region for the identi￿ed features of an incomplete econo-
metric model is sharp is a key question in identi￿cation analysis. Given the joint distribution of the
observed variables, a researcher asks herself what parameters ￿ are consistent with this distribution.
The sharp identi￿cation region is the collection of parameter values that could generate the same
distribution of observables as the one in the data, for some data generating process consistent with
the maintained assumptions. Examples of sharp identi￿cation regions for parameters of incomplete
models are given in Manski (1989, 2003), Manski and Tamer (2002), and Molinari (2008), among
others. In some cases, researchers are only able to characterize a region in the parameter space that
includes all the parameter values that may have generated the observables, but may include other
(infeasible) parameter values as well. These larger regions are called outer regions. The inclusion
in the outer regions of parameter values which are infeasible may weaken the researcher￿ s ability to
make useful predictions, and to test for model misspeci￿cation.
Using the theory of random sets (Molchanov (2005)), we provide a general methodology that
allows us to characterize the sharp identi￿cation region for the parameters of models with convex
moment predictions in a computationally tractable manner. Our main insight is that for a given
candidate value of ￿; the (conditional or unconditional) Aumann expectation of a properly de￿ned
￿-dependent random closed set coincides with the convex set of model moment predictions.2 That
is, this Aumann expectation gives the convex set, implied by the candidate ￿; of moments for
the relevant variables which are consistent with all the model￿ s implications. This is a crucial
advancement compared to the related literature, where researchers are often unable to fully exploit
the information provided by the model that they are studying, and work with just a subset of
model￿ s implications. In turn, this advancement allows us to characterize the sharp identi￿cation
region of ￿; denoted ￿I; through a simple necessary and su¢ cient condition. Assume that the model
is correctly speci￿ed. Then ￿ is in ￿I if and only if the conditional Aumann expectation (a convex
2We formally de￿ne the notion of random closed set in Appendix A and the notion of conditional Aumann
expectation in Section 2.
2set) of the properly de￿ned random set associated with ￿; contains the conditional expectation of a
properly de￿ned vector of random variables observed in the data (a point).3 The methodology that
we propose allows us to verify this condition by checking whether the support function of such point
is dominated by the support function of the ￿-dependent convex set.4 The latter can be evaluated
exactly or approximated by simulation, depending on the complexity of the model. Showing that
this dominance holds amounts to checking whether the di⁄erence between the support function of
a point (a linear function) and the support function of a convex set (a sublinear function) in a
direction given by a vector u attains a maximum of zero as u ranges in the unit ball of appropriate
dimension. This amounts to maximizing a superlinear function over a convex set, a task which can
be carried out e¢ ciently using algorithms in convex programming (e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004), Grant and Boyd (2008)).
It is natural to wonder which model with set valued predictions may not belong to the class of
models to which our methodology applies. Our approach is speci￿cally tailored towards frameworks
where ￿I can be characterized via conditional or unconditional expectations of observable random
vectors and model predictions.5 Within these models, if restrictions are imposed on the selection
process, non-convex sets of moments may result. We are chie￿ y interested in the case that no
untestable assumptions are imposed on the selection process, and therefore exploring identi￿cation
in models with non-convex moment predictions is beyond the scope of this paper.
There are no precedents to our general characterization of the sharp identi￿cation region of
models with convex moment predictions. However, there is one precedent to the use of the Aumann
expectation as a key tool to describe fundamental features of partially identi￿ed models. This is
the work of Beresteanu and Molinari (2006, 2008), who were the ￿rst to illustrate the bene￿ts of
using elements of random sets theory to conduct identi￿cation analysis and statistical inference for
incomplete econometric models in the space of sets, in a manner which is the exact analog of how
these tasks are commonly performed for point identi￿ed models in the space of vectors.
In related work, Galichon and Henry (2009a) study ￿nite games of complete information with
multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria. They characterize the sharp identi￿cation region of ￿
3This is because when such condition is satis￿ed, there exists a vector of conditional expectations associated with
￿ that is consistent with all the implications of the model, and coincides with the vector of conditional expectations
observed in the data.
4￿The support function [of a nonempty closed convex set B in direction u] h(B;u) is the signed distance of the
support plane to B with exterior normal vector u from the origin; the distance is negative if and only if u points into
the open half space containing the origin,￿Schneider (1993, page 37). See Rockafellar (1970, Chapter 13) or Schneider
(1993, Section 1.7) for a thorough discussion of the support function of a closed convex set, and its properties.
5In Section 2.2 we explain what mathematical features of conditional Aumann expectations yield the computational
tractability that is novel to our approach.
3through the capacity functional (i.e., the ￿probability distribution￿ ) of the random set of pure
strategy equilibrium outcomes, by exploiting a result due to Artstein (1983).6 They also show that
under certain monotonicity restrictions, further computational simpli￿cations may be obtained by
using tools of optimal transportation theory. With pure strategies only, the characterization based
on the capacity functional is ￿dual￿to ours, as we formally establish in Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2010b, Appendix B.2). It cannot, however, be extended to the general case where
mixed strategies are allowed for, as discussed also in Galichon and Henry (2009a, Section 4), nor to
other solution concepts such as, for example, correlated equilibrium. Hence, in order to deal with
more general game theoretic models, Galichon and Henry (2009a) apply our methodology.
While our main contribution lies in the identi￿cation analysis that we carry out, our charac-
terization leads to an obvious sample analog counterpart which can be used when the researcher
is confronted with a ￿nite sample of observations. This sample analog is given by the set of min-
imizers of a sample criterion function. We establish that the methodology of Andrews and Shi
(2009) can be applied in our context, to obtain con￿dence sets that uniformly cover each element
of the sharp identi￿cation region with a prespeci￿ed asymptotic probability. Related methods for
statistical inference in partially identi￿ed models include, among others, Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Tamer (2004, 2007), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006), Beresteanu and Molinari (2008), Rosen
(2008), Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009), Galichon and Henry (2009b), Kim (2009), Andrews
and Soares (2010), Bugni (2010), Canay (2010), and Romano and Shaikh (2010).
Structure of the Paper. In Section 2 we describe formally the class of econometric models to
which our methodology applies, and we provide our characterization of the sharp identi￿cation
region. In Section 3 we analyze in detail the identi￿cation problem in static, simultaneous move
￿nite games of complete information in the presence of multiple mixed strategy Nash equilibria
(MSNE), and show how the results of Section 2 can be applied. In Section 4, we show that our
approach easily applies to ￿nite games of incomplete information, and characterizes ￿I through a
￿nite number of moment inequalities. In Section 5 we show how the results of Section 2 can be
applied to best linear prediction with interval outcome and covariate data. Section 6 concludes.
Appendix A contains de￿nitions taken from random sets theory, proofs of the results appearing in
6Galichon and Henry (2006) use the notion of capacity functional of a properly de￿ned random set and the results
of Artstein (1983), to provide a speci￿cation test for partially identi￿ed structural models, thereby extending the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of correct model speci￿cation to partially identi￿ed models. They then de￿ne the notion of
￿core determining￿classes of sets, to ￿nd a manageable class of sets for which to check that the dominance condition is
satis￿ed. Beresteanu and Molinari (2006, 2008) use Artstein￿ s (1983) result to establish sharpness of the identi￿cation
region of the parameters of a best linear predictor with interval outcome data.
4the main text,7 and details concerning the computational issues associated with our methodology
(for concreteness, we focus on the case of ￿nite games of complete information).
Appendices B-D are given in the Supplement to this paper, Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Moli-
nari (2010b). Appendix B specializes our results for the case that players are restricted to use
pure strategies only and Nash equilibrium is the solution concept. In this case, ￿I is character-
ized through a ￿nite number of moment inequalities, and further insights are provided on how to
reduce the number of inequalities to be checked in order to compute it. Appendix C shows that
our methodology is applicable to static simultaneous move ￿nite games regardless of the solution
concept used.8 Appendix D applies the results of Section 2 to the analysis of individual decision
making in random utility models of multinomial choice in the presence of interval regressors data.
2 Semi-parametric Models with Convex Moment Predictions
Notation. Throughout the paper, we use capital Latin letters to denote sets and random sets. We
use lower case Latin letters for random vectors. We denote parameter vectors and sets of parameter
vectors, respectively by ￿ and ￿: For a given ￿nite set W; we denote by ￿W its cardinality. We
denote by ￿d￿1 the unit simplex in <d: Given two non-empty sets A;B ￿ <d; we denote the directed
Hausdor⁄ distance from A to B, the Hausdor⁄ distance between A and B, and the Hausdor⁄ norm
of B; respectively, by




ka ￿ bk; ￿H (A;B) = maxfdH (A;B);dH (B;A)g; kBkH = sup
b2B
kbk:
Outline. In this Section we describe formally the class of econometric models to which our
methodology applies, and we provide our characterization of the sharp identi￿cation region. In
Sections 3, 4 and 5 we illustrate how empirically relevant models ￿t into this general framework.
In particular, we show how to verify, for these models, the assumptions listed below.
2.1 Framework
Consider an econometric model which speci￿es a vector z of random variables observable by the re-
searcher, a vector ￿ of random variables unobservable by the researcher, and an unknown parameter
vector ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ <p; with ￿ the parameter space. Maintain the following assumptions:
7The only proof appearing in the main text is that of our fundamental result, Theorem 2.1.
8Speci￿cally, we illustrate this by looking at games where rationality of level-1 is the solution concept (a problem
￿rst studied by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008)), and by looking at games where correlated equilibrium is the
solution concept.
5Assumption 2.1 (Probability Space) The random vectors (z;￿) are de￿ned on a probability
space (￿;F;P): The ￿-algebra F is generated by (z;￿). The researcher conditions her analysis
upon a sub-￿-algebra of F, denoted G, which is generated by a subvector of z: The probability space
contains no G￿atoms. Speci￿cally, 8 A 2 F having positive measure, there is a B ￿ A such that
0 < P(BjG) < P(AjG) with positive probability.
Assumption 2.2 (Set Valued Predictions) For a given value of ￿; the model maps each real-
ization of (z;￿) to a non-empty closed set Q￿ (z;￿) ￿ <d: The functional form of this map is known
to the researcher.
Assumption 2.3 (Absolutely Integrable Random Closed Set) For every compact set C in
<d and all ￿ 2 ￿;
f! 2 ￿ : Q￿ (z (!);￿ (!)) \ C 6= ;g 2 F:
Moreover, E(kQ￿ (z;￿)kH) < 1:
Assumption 2.1 requires the probability space to be non-atomic with respect to the ￿-algebra G
upon which the researcher conditions her analysis. This technical assumption is not restrictive for
most economic applications, as we show in Sections 3, 4 and 5. For example, it is satis￿ed whenever
the distribution of ￿ conditional on G is continuous.
Assumption 2.2 requires the model to have set valued predictions.9 As we further explain below,
the set Q￿ (z;￿) is the fundamental object that we use to relate the convex set of model moment
predictions, to the observable moments of random vectors. In Sections 3, 4 and 5 we provide
examples of how Q￿ (z;￿) needs to be constructed in speci￿c applications to exploit all the model
information.
Assumption 2.3 is a measurability condition, requiring Q￿ (z;￿) to be an integrably bounded
random closed set, see De￿nitions A.1-A.2 in Appendix A. It guarantees that any (F-measurable)
random vector q such that q (!) 2 Q￿ (z (!);￿ (!)) a:s: is absolutely integrable.
In what follows, for ease of notation, we write the set Q￿ (z;￿) and its realizations, respectively,
as Q￿ and Q￿ (!) ￿ Q￿ (z (!);￿ (!)); ! 2 ￿; omitting the explicit reference to z and ￿: The
researcher wishes to learn ￿ from the observed distribution of z: Because the model makes set
valued predictions, we maintain the following assumption:
9A model which makes singleton predictions with probability one is a special case of the more general class of
models analyzed here.
6Assumption 2.4 (Selected Prediction) The econometric model can be augmented with an un-
known selection mechanism which selects one of the model predictions, yielding a map   which
depends on z and ￿; and may depend on ￿, and which satis￿es the following conditions:
(i)  (z (!);￿ (!);￿) 2 Q￿ (!) for almost all ! 2 ￿;
(ii)  (z (!);￿ (!);￿) is F-measurable for all ￿ 2 ￿:
Assumption 2.4 requires that the econometric model can be ￿completed￿with an unknown selection
mechanism. Economic theory often provides no guidance on the form of the selection mechanism,
which therefore we leave completely unspeci￿ed. For each ! 2 ￿; the process of selection results in
a random element   which takes values in Q￿; i.e., is a model￿ s selected prediction.10 The map   is
unknown and constitutes a nonparametric component of the model; it may depend on unobservable
variables even after conditioning on observable variables. We insert ￿ as an argument of   to re￿ ect
the fact that Assumption 2.4-(i) requires   to belong to the ￿-dependent set Q￿:
In this paper we restrict attention to models where the set of observationally equivalent parame-
ter vectors ￿; denoted ￿I; can be characterized via conditional expectations of observable random
vectors and model predictions. One may ￿nd many values for the parameter vector ￿ which, when
coupled with maps   satisfying Assumption 2.4, generate the same moments as the ones observed
in the data. Hence, we assume that ￿I can be characterized through selected predictions as follows:
Assumption 2.5 (Sharp Identi￿cation Region) Given the available data and Assumptions 2.1-
2.3, the sharp identi￿cation region of ￿ is
(2.1)
￿I = f￿ 2 ￿ : 9  (z;￿;￿) satisfying Assumption 2.4, s.t. E(w(z)jG) = E( (z;￿;￿)jG) a:s:g;
where w(￿) is a known function mapping z into vectors in <d and E(w(z)jG) is identi￿ed by the
data.
The process of ￿unrestricted selection￿yielding  ￿ s satisfying Assumption 2.4 builds all possible
mixtures of elements of Q￿: When one takes expectations of these mixtures, the resulting set of
expectations is the convex set of moment predictions:
fE( (z;￿;￿)jG) :  (z;￿;￿) satis￿es Assumption 2.4g.
Convexity of this set is formally established in the next Section.
10For expository clarity, we observe that even for !1 6= !2 such that z (!1) = z (!2) and ￿ (!1) = ￿ (!2);
 (z (!1);￿ (!1);￿) may di⁄er from  (z (!2);￿ (!2);￿):
7Using the notion of selected prediction, Assumption 2.5 characterizes abstractly the sharp iden-
ti￿cation region of a large class of incomplete econometric models, in a fairly intuitive manner.
This characterization builds on previous ones given by Berry and Tamer (2007) and Tamer (2009,
Section 3). However, because   is a rather general random function, it may constitute an in￿nite
dimensional nuisance parameter, which creates great di¢ culties for the computation of ￿I and
for inference. In this paper, we provide a complementary approach based on tools of random sets
theory. We characterize ￿I avoiding altogether the need to deal with  ; thereby contributing to a
stream of previous literature which has provided tractable characterizations of sharp identi￿cation
regions without making any reference to the selection mechanism or the selected prediction (see,
e.g., Manski (2003) and Manski and Tamer (2002)).
2.2 Representation Through Random Sets Theory
As suggested by Aumann (1965), one can think of a random closed set (or random correspondence
in Aumann￿ s work) as a bundle of random variables ￿its measurable selections, see De￿nition A.3
in Appendix A. We follow this idea, and denote by Sel(Q￿) the collection of F-measurable random
elements q with values in <d such that q(!) 2 Q￿ (!) for almost all ! 2 ￿: As it turns out, there
is not just a simple assonance between ￿selected prediction￿and ￿measurable selection.￿Our ￿rst
result establishes a one-to-one correspondence between them.
Lemma 2.1 Let Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold. For any given ￿ 2 ￿; q 2 Sel(Q￿) if and only if there
exists a selected prediction  (z;￿;￿) satisfying Assumption 2.4, such that q (!) =  (z (!);￿ (!);￿)
for almost all ! 2 ￿:
The de￿nition of the sharp identi￿cation region in Assumption 2.5 indicates that one needs to
take conditional expectations of the elements of Sel(Q￿): Observe that by Assumption 2.3, Q￿ is
an integrably bounded random closed set, and therefore all its selections are integrable. Hence, we
can de￿ne the conditional Aumann expectation (Aumann (1965)) of Q￿ as
E(Q￿jG) = fE(qjG) : q 2 Sel(Q￿)g;
where the notation E(￿jG) denotes the conditional Aumann expectation of the random set in
parentheses, while we reserve the notation E(￿jG) for the conditional expectation of a random
vector. By Theorem 2.1.46 in Molchanov (2005) the conditional Aumann expectation exists and is
unique. Because F contains no G-atoms, and because the random set Q￿ takes its realizations in a
subset of the ￿nite dimensional space <d, it follows from Theorem 1.2 of Dynkin and Evstigneev
8(1976) and from Theorem 2.1.24 of Molchanov (2005), that E(Q￿jG) is a closed convex set a:s:;
such that E(Q￿jG) = E(co[Q￿]jG), with co[￿] the convex hull of the set in square brackets.
Our second result establishes that E(Q￿jG) coincides with the convex set of model￿ s moment
predictions:
Lemma 2.2 Let Assumptions 2.1-2.3 hold. For any given ￿ 2 ￿; E(Q￿jG) = fE( (z;￿;￿)jG) :
 (z;￿;￿) satis￿es Assumption 2.4g, and therefore the latter set is convex.
Hence, the set of observationally equivalent parameter values in Assumption 2.5 can be written as
￿I = f￿ 2 ￿ : E(w(z)jG) 2 E(Q￿jG) a:s:g
The fundamental characterization result of this paper is the following:
Theorem 2.1 Let Assumptions 2.1-2.5 be satis￿ed, and no other information be available. Let
h(Q￿;u) ￿ supq2Q￿ u0q denote the support function of Q￿ in direction u 2 <d: Then
￿I =
￿



















u 2 <d : kuk ￿ 1
￿
; U is a probability measure on B with support equal to B; and for
any a 2 <; (a)+ = maxf0;ag:
Proof. The equivalence between equations (2.2)-(2.3) follows immediately, observing that the
integrand in equation (2.3) is continuous in u and both conditions inside the curly brackets are
satis￿ed if and only if
(2.4) u0E(w(z)jG) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jG] ￿ 0 8u 2 B a:s:
In order to establish sharpness, it su¢ ces to show that for a given ￿ 2 ￿ expression (2.4) holds
if and only if ￿ 2 ￿I as de￿ned in equation (2.1). Take ￿ 2 ￿ such that expression (2.4) holds.
Theorem 2.1.47-(iv) in Molchanov (2005) assures that
(2.5) E[h(Q￿;u)jG] = h(E(Q￿jG);u) 8u 2 <d a:s:
Recalling that the support function is positive homogeneous, equation (2.4) holds if and only if
(2.6) u0E(w(z)jG) ￿ h(E(Q￿jG);u) 8u 2 <d a:s:
9Standard arguments in convex analysis (see, e.g. Rockafellar (1970, Theorem 13.1)) assure that
equation (2.6) holds if and only if E(w(z)jG) 2 E(Q￿jG) a:s:; and therefore by Lemma 2.2 ￿ 2 ￿I:
Conversely, take ￿ 2 ￿I as de￿ned in equation (2.1). Then there exists a selected prediction  
satisfying Assumption 2.4, such that E(w(z)jG) = E( (z;￿;￿)jG). By Lemma 2.2 and the above
argument, it follows that expression (2.4) holds.
It is well known (e.g., Rockafellar (1970, Chapter 13), Schneider (1993, Section 1.7)) that the
support function of a non-empty closed convex set is a continuous convex sublinear function.11
This holds also for the support function of the convex set of moment predictions. However, calcu-
lating this set is computationally prohibitive in many cases. The fundamental simpli￿cation comes
from equation (2.5), which assures that one can work directly with the conditional expectation of
h(Q￿;u): This expectation is quite straightforward to compute. Hence, the characterization in
equation (2.2) is computationally very attractive, because for each candidate ￿ 2 ￿ it requires to
maximize an easy-to-compute superlinear, hence concave, function over a convex set, and check
if the resulting objective value is equal to zero. This problem is computationally tractable and
several e¢ cient algorithms in convex programming are available to solve it, see for example the
book by Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), and the MatLab software for disciplined convex program-
ming CVX by Grant and Boyd (2010). Similarly, the characterization in equation (2.3) can be
implemented by calculating integrals of concave functions over a convex set, a task which can be
carried out in random polynomial time (see, e.g. Dyer, Frieze, and Kannan (1991) and LovÆsz and
Vempala (2006)).
Remark 2.1 Using the method proposed by Andrews and Shi (2009), expression (2.4) can be
transformed, using appropriate instruments, into a set of unconditional moment inequalities in-
dexed by the instruments and by u 2 B; even when the conditioning variables have a continuous
distribution. Equations (2.2)-(2.3) can be modi￿ed accordingly, to yield straightforward criterion
functions which are minimized by every parameter in the sharp identi￿cation region. When faced
with a ￿nite sample of data, one can obtain a sample analog of these criterion functions by replac-
ing the unconditional counterpart of the moment u0E(w(z)jG) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jG] with its sample
analog. The resulting statistics correspond,12 respectively, to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and
11In particular, for a given set A ￿ <
d; h(A;u + v) ￿ h(A;u) + h(A;v) for all u;v 2 <
d and h(A;cu) = ch(A;u)
for all c > 0 and for all u 2 <
d: Additionally, one can show that the support function of a bounded set A ￿ <
d is
Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant kAkH ; see Molchanov (2005, Theorem F.1).
12Because u = 0 2 B; the function (u
0E(g (z)jG) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jG]) and its positive part achieve the same maxi-
mum value for u 2 B: Andrews and Shi￿ s test statistics are obtained by replacing (u
0E(g (z)jG) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jG])+
with its square, and by choosing appropriate instruments (as detailed in Andrews and Shi￿ s Section 3) to transform
10the CramØr-von Mises (CvM) statistics introduced by Andrews and Shi (2009, see their equations
(3.6), (3.7), (3.8), and their Section 9). When the assumptions imposed by Andrews and Shi are
satis￿ed, one can obtain con￿dence sets that have correct uniform asymptotic coverage probability
for the true parameter vector, by inverting the KS or the CvM tests. Under mild regularity con-
ditions, these assumptions are satis￿ed using our characterization, because our moment function
in expression (2.4) is Lipschitz in u: In Appendix A.3 we formally establish this for the models in
Sections 3, 4 and 5.13
3 Application I: Finite Games of Complete Information
3.1 Model Set-Up
We consider simultaneous-move games of complete information (normal form games) in which each
player has a ￿nite set of actions (pure strategies) Yj; j = 1;:::;J; with J the number of players. Let
y = (y1;:::;yJ) 2 Y denote a generic vector specifying an action for each player, with Y = ￿J
j=1Yj
and Y￿j = ￿i6=jYi: Let ￿j (yj;y￿j;xj;"j;￿) denote the payo⁄ function for player j; where y￿j is
the vector of player j￿ s opponents￿actions, xj 2 X is a vector of observable payo⁄ shifters, "j is
a payo⁄ shifter observed by the players but unobserved by the econometrician, and ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ <p
is a vector of parameters of interest, with ￿ the parameter space. Let ￿j : Yj ! [0;1] denote the
mixed strategy for player j that assigns to each action yj 2 Yj a probability ￿j (yj) ￿ 0 that it is
played, with
P
yj2Yj ￿j (yj) = 1 for each j = 1;:::;J: Let ￿(Yj) denote the mixed extension of Yj;
and ￿(Y) = ￿J
j=1￿(Yj): With the usual slight abuse of notation, denote by ￿j (￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿)
the expected payo⁄ associated with the mixed strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿J): With respect to
the general notation used in Section 2, z = (y;x), ￿ = "; F is the ￿-algebra generated by (y;x;");
and G is the ￿-algebra generated by x. We formalize our assumptions on the games and sampling
processes as follows. These assumptions are fairly standard in the literature.14
the conditional moment inequalities in unconditional ones. See Appendix A.3 for details.
13Imbens and Manski (2004, see also Stoye (2009)) discuss the di⁄erence between con￿dence sets that uniformly
cover the true parameter vector with a prespeci￿ed asymptotic probability, and con￿dence sets that uniformly cover
￿I: Providing methodologies to obtain asymptotically valid con￿dence sets of either type when the conditioning
variables have a continuous distribution, is a developing area of research, to which the method of Andrews and
Shi (2009) belongs. In certain empirically relevant models (see for example Section 4 and Beresteanu, Molchanov,
and Molinari (2010b, Appendix B and Appendix D)) the characterization in Theorem 2.1 yields a ￿nite number
of (conditional) moment inequalities. In such cases, the methods of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) and
Romano and Shaikh (2010) can be applied after discretizing the conditioning variables, to obtain con￿dence sets
which cover ￿I with a prespeci￿ed asymptotic probability, uniformly in the case of Romano and Shaikh (2010).
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) verify the required regularity conditions for ￿nite games of complete information.
14We assume that players￿actions and the outcomes observable by the econometrician coincide. This is a standard
assumption in the literature, see e.g. ABJ, CT, Berry and Tamer (2007) and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2009). Our
11Assumption 3.1 (i) The set of outcomes of the game Y is ￿nite. Each player j has ￿Yj ￿ 2 pure
strategies to choose from. The number of players is J ￿ 2:
(ii) The observed outcome of the game results from static, simultaneous move, Nash play.
(iii) The parametric form of the payo⁄ functions ￿j (yj;y￿j;xj;"j;￿); j = 1;:::;J; is known, and
for a known action ￿ y it is normalized to ￿j (￿ yj; ￿ y￿j;xj;"j;￿) = 0 for each j: The payo⁄ functions
are continuous in xj and "j. The parameter space ￿ is compact.15
Assumption 3.2 The econometrician observes data that identify P(yjx): The observed matrix
of payo⁄ shifters x is comprised of the non-redundant elements of xj; j = 1;:::;J: The unobserved
random vector " = ("1;:::;"J) has a continuous conditional distribution function F￿ ("jx) that is
known up to a ￿nite dimensional parameter vector that is part of ￿:
Remark 3.1 Under Assumption 3.2, Assumption 2.1 is satis￿ed.
It is well known that the games and sampling processes satisfying Assumptions 3.1-3.2 may
lead to multiple MSNE and partial identi￿cation of the model parameters, see for example Berry
and Tamer (2007) for a thorough discussion of this problem. To achieve point identi￿cation, Bjorn
and Vuong (1985), Bresnahan and Reiss (1988, 1990, 1991), Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002), Tamer
(2003), and Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2009), for example, add assumptions concerning the nature of
competition, heterogeneity of ￿rms, availability of covariates with su¢ ciently large support and/or
instrumental variables, and restrictions on the selection mechanism which, in the data generating
process, determines the equilibrium played in the regions of multiplicity.16
We show that the models considered in this Section satisfy Assumptions 2.1-2.5, and therefore
our methodology gives a computationally feasible characterization of ￿I. Our approach does not
impose any assumption on the nature of competition, on the form of heterogeneity across players,
or on the selection mechanism. It does not require availability of covariates with large support or
instruments, but fully exploits their identifying power if they are present.
results, however, apply to the more general case that the strategy pro￿les determine the outcomes observable by
the econometrician through an outcome rule known by the econometrician, as we illustrate with a simple example
in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2010b, Appendix B.1). Of course, the outcome rule needs to satisfy
assumptions guaranteeing that it conveys some information about players actions.
15Continuity is needed to establish measurability and closedness of certain sets. A location normalization is needed
because if we add a constant to the payo⁄ of each action, the set of equilibria does not change.
16Tamer (2003) also suggests an approach to partially identify the model￿ s parameters when no additional assump-
tions are imposed.
123.2 The Sharp Identi￿cation Region
For a given realization of (x;"); the mixed strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿J) constitutes a Nash
equilibrium if ￿j (￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) ￿ ￿j (~ ￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) 8~ ￿j 2 ￿(Yj); 8j = 1;:::;J: Hence, for a
given realization of (x;") we de￿ne the ￿-dependent set of MSNE as
(3.1) S￿ (x;") = f￿ 2 ￿(Y) : ￿j (￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) ￿ ￿j (~ ￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) 8~ ￿j 2 ￿(Yj) 8jg:
Example 3.1 Consider a simple two player entry game similar to the one in Tamer (2003), omit
the covariates, assume that players￿payo⁄s are given by ￿j = yj (y￿j￿j + "j); where yj 2 f0;1g
and ￿j < 0; j = 1;2: Let ￿j 2 [0;1] denote the probability that player j enters the market, with
1 ￿ ￿j the probability that he does not. Figure 1-(a) plots the set of mixed strategy equilibrium
pro￿les S￿ (") resulting from the possible realizations of "1;"2: ￿
For ease of notation we write the set S￿ (x;") and its realizations, respectively, as S￿ and
S￿ (!) ￿ S￿ (x(!);"(!)); ! 2 ￿; omitting the explicit reference to x and ": Proposition 3.1
establishes that the set S￿ is a random closed set in ￿(Y).
Proposition 3.1 Let Assumption 3.1 hold. Then the set S￿ is a random closed set in ￿(Y) as
per De￿nition A.1 in Appendix A.
For a given ￿ 2 ￿ and ! 2 ￿; each element ￿ (!) ￿ (￿1 (!);:::;￿J (!)) 2 S￿ (!) is one of
the admissible mixed strategy Nash equilibrium pro￿les associated with the realizations x(!) and
"(!); and it takes values in ￿(Y): The resulting random elements ￿ = f￿ (!);! 2 ￿g are the
selections of S￿, denoted Sel(S￿); see De￿nition A.3 in Appendix A.
Example 3.1 (Cont.) Consider the set S￿ plotted in Figure 1-(a). Let ￿M = f! 2 ￿ : "(!) 2
[0;￿￿1] ￿ [0;￿￿2]g: Then for ! = 2 ￿M the set S￿ has only one selection, since the equilibrium is
unique. For ! 2 ￿M; S￿ contains a rich set of selections, which can be obtained as











if ! 2 ￿M
2 ;
(0;1) if ! 2 ￿M
3 ;
for all measurable disjoint ￿M
i ￿ ￿M; i = 1;2;3; such that ￿M
1 [ ￿M
2 [ ￿M
3 = ￿M: ￿
By de￿nition of a mixed strategy pro￿le, ￿j (!) : Yj ! [0;1] assigns to each action tj 2 Yj
a probability ￿j (!;tj) ￿ 0 that it is played, with
P
tj2Yj ￿j (!;tj) = 1; j = 1;:::;J: Index the
set Y = ￿J










13k = 1;:::;￿Y. Then for a given parameter value ￿ 2 ￿ and realization ￿ (!); ! 2 ￿; of a selection








can use a selection ￿ 2 Sel(S￿) to de￿ne a random vector q (￿) whose realizations have coordinates
(3.2)
 








; k = 1;:::;￿Y
!
:
By construction, the random point q (￿) is an element of ￿￿Y￿1. For given ! 2 ￿; each vector
([q (￿ (!))]k ;k = 1;:::;￿Y) is the multinomial distribution over outcomes of the game (a J-tuple
of actions) determined by the mixed strategy equilibrium ￿ (!): Repeating the above construction
for each ￿ 2 Sel(S￿), we obtain
(3.3) Q￿ = f([q (￿)]k ;k = 1;:::;￿Y) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)g:
Remark 3.2 The set Q￿ ￿ Q￿ (x;") satis￿es Assumption 2.2 by construction. By Proposition 3.1,
Q￿ is a random closed set in ￿￿Y￿1; because it is given by a continuous map applied to the random
closed set S￿: Because every realization of q 2 Sel(Q￿) is contained in ￿￿Y￿1, Q￿ is integrably
bounded. Hence, Assumption 2.3 is satis￿ed.










(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2)










Figure 1-(b) plots the set Q￿ resulting from the possible realizations of "1;"2: ￿
Because Q￿ is an integrably bounded random closed set, all its selections are integrable and its
conditional Aumann expectation is
E(Q￿jx) = fE(qjx) : q 2 Sel(Q￿)g
= f(E([q (￿)]kjx);k = 1;:::;￿Y) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)g:
Example 3.1 (Cont.) Consider the set Q￿ plotted in Figure 1-(b). Let ￿M = f! 2 ￿ : "(!) 2
[0;￿￿1] ￿ [0;￿￿2]g: Then for ! = 2 ￿M the set Q￿ has only one selection, since the equilibrium is
unique. For ! 2 ￿M; the selections of Q￿ are:




[0 1 0 0]









if ! 2 ￿M
2 ;
[0 0 1 0]
0 if ! 2 ￿M
3 ;









































The expectations of the selections of Q￿ build the set E(Q￿), which is a convex subset of ￿3 with
in￿nitely many extreme points. ￿
The set E(Q￿jx) collects vectors of probabilities with which each outcome of the game can
be observed. It is obtained by integrating the probability distribution over outcomes of the game
implied by each mixed strategy equilibrium ￿ given x and " (that is, by integrating each element
of Sel(Q￿)), against the probability measure of "jx. We emphasize that in case of multiplicity,
a di⁄erent mixed strategy equilibrium ￿ (!) 2 S￿ (!) may be selected (with di⁄erent probability)
for each !: By construction, E(Q￿jx) is the set of probability distributions over action pro￿les
conditional on x which are consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, i.e., with all the
model￿ s implications. In other words, it is the convex set of moment predictions.
If the model is correctly speci￿ed, there exists at least one value of ￿ 2 ￿ such that the observed










.17 Hence, the set of observationally equivalent parameter
values which form the sharp identi￿cation region is given by
(3.4) ￿I = f￿ 2 ￿ : P(yjx) 2 E(Q￿jx) x ￿ a:s:g
Theorem 3.2 Let Assumptions 3.1-3.2 hold, and no other information be available. Then
￿I =
￿














+ dU = 0 x ￿ a:s:
o
(3.6)









and u0 = [u1 u2 ::: u￿Y]:18
Theorem 3.2 follows immediately from Theorem 2.1, because Assumptions 2.1-2.5 are satis￿ed for
this application, as summarized in Remarks 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 (the latter given below).
By Wilson￿ s (1971) result, the realizations of the set of MSNE, S￿; are almost surely ￿nite
sets. Therefore, the same holds for Q￿. Hence, for given ! 2 ￿; h(Q￿ (!);u) is given by the
17By the de￿nition of E(Q￿jx); P(yjx) 2 E(Q￿jx) if and only if 9 q 2 Sel(Q￿) : E(qjx) = P(yjx):
18Recall that B is the unit ball in <
￿Y and U is a probability measure on B with support equal to B: Recall also
that Y = ft
1;t
2;:::;t









is a J-tuple specifying one
action in Yj for each player j = 1;:::;J:
15maximum among the inner product of u with a ￿nite number of vectors, the elements of Q￿ (!):
These elements are known functions of (x(!);"(!)): Hence, given Q￿; the expectation of h(Q￿;u)
is easy to compute.
Example 3.1 (Cont.) Consider the set Q￿ plotted in Figure 1-(b). Pick a direction u ￿ [u1 u2 u3 u4]
0
2 B: Then, for ! 2 ￿ such that "(!) 2 (￿1;0] ￿ (￿1;0]; we have Q￿ (!) =
￿
[1 0 0 0]
0￿
; and
h(Q￿ (!);u) = u1: For ! 2 ￿ such that "(!) 2 [0;￿￿1]￿[0;￿￿2]; we have Q￿ (!) =
￿









; [0 0 1 0]
0￿












plots h(Q￿ (!);u) against the possible realizations of "1;"2: ￿
By a way of comparison with the previous literature, and to show how Assumptions 2.4-2.5
can be veri￿ed, we provide the abstract de￿nition of ￿I given by Berry and Tamer (2007, equation
(2.21), page 67) for the case of a two player entry game, extending it to ￿nite games with potentially
more than two players and two actions. A ￿nite game with multiple equilibria can be completed by
a random vector which has almost surely non-negative entries that sum up to one, and which gives
the probability with which each equilibrium in the regions of multiplicity is played when the game
is de￿ned by (x;";￿). Denote such (random) discrete distribution by ￿(￿;x;";￿) : S￿ ! ￿￿S￿￿1:
Notice that ￿(￿;x;";￿) is left unspeci￿ed and can depend on market unobservables even after
conditioning on market observables. By de￿nition, the sharp identi￿cation region includes all the
parameter values for which one can ￿nd a random vector ￿(￿;x;";￿) satisfying the above conditions,
such that the model augmented with this selection mechanism generates the joint distribution of






￿ 2 ￿ :































Finally, observe that using ￿(￿;x;";￿) one can construct a selected prediction   (x;";￿) as a random







; k = 1;:::;￿Y
i
; with probability ￿(￿;x;";￿); ￿ 2 Sel(S￿):
Remark 3.3 The random vector   (x;";￿) is a selected prediction satisfying Assumption 2.4. Ob-









; k = 1;:::;￿Y
i
dF ("jx),
where the integral is taken coordinate-wise, Assumption 2.5 is veri￿ed.
16Remark 3.4 Appendix A.3 veri￿es Andrews and Shi￿ s (2009) regularity conditions for models
satisfying Assumptions 3.1-3.2, under the additional assumption that the researcher observes an
i.i.d. sequence of equilibrium outcomes and observable payo⁄shifters fyi;xig
n
i=1. Andrews and Shi￿ s
(2009) generalized moment selection procedure with in￿nitely many conditional moment inequalities
can therefore be applied, to obtain con￿dence sets that have correct uniform asymptotic coverage.
3.3 Comparison with the Outer Regions of ABJ and CT
While ABJ and CT discuss only the case that players are restricted to use pure strategies, it is clear
and explained in Berry and Tamer (2007, pp. 65-70) that their insights can be extended to the
case that players are allowed to randomize over their strategies. Here we discuss the relationship
between such extensions, and the methodology that we propose.19
In the presence of multiple equilibria, ABJ observe that an implication of the model is that for
a given tk 2 Y; P
￿
y = tk￿ ￿x
￿
cannot be larger than the probability that tk is a possible equilibrium
outcome of the game. This is because for given ￿ 2 ￿ and realization of (x;") such that tk is a
possible equilibrium outcome of the game, there can be another outcome tl 2 Y which is also a
possible equilibrium outcome of the game, and when both are possible tk is selected only part of
the time. CT point out that additional information can be learned from the model. In particular,
P
￿
y = tk￿ ￿x
￿
cannot be smaller than the probability that tk is the unique equilibrium outcome of the
game. This is because tk is certainly realized whenever it is the only possible equilibrium outcome,
but it can additionally be realized when it belongs to a set of multiple equilibrium outcomes.
The following Proposition rewrites the outer regions originally proposed by ABJ and CT, de-
noted ￿ABJ
O and ￿CT
O ; using our notation. It then establishes their connection with ￿I:
Proposition 3.3 Let Assumptions 3.1-3.2 hold, and no other information be available. Then the













[q (￿)]k dF￿ ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿





￿ 2 ￿ :
min
￿R









[q (￿)]k dF￿ ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
; for k = 1;:::;￿Y; x ￿ a:s:
￿
￿ABJ
O can be obtained by solving the maximization problem in equation (3.5) over the restricted set
of u￿ s equal to the canonical basis vectors in <￿Y: ￿CT
O can be obtained by solving the maximization
19Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2009, Section 3.3) revisit Example 3.1 in light of this comparison.
17problem in equation (3.5) over the restricted set of u￿ s equal to the canonical basis vectors in <￿Y
and each of these vectors multiplied by ￿1.
Hence, the approaches of ABJ and CT can be interpreted on the base of our analysis as follows.
For each ￿ 2 ￿; ABJ￿ s inequalities give the closed half spaces delimited by hyperplanes that are
parallel to the axis and that support E(Q￿jx). ￿ABJ
O is the collection of ￿￿ s such that P(yjx)
is contained in the non-negative part of such closed half spaces x ￿ a:s: CT use a more re￿ned
approach, and for each ￿ 2 ￿ their inequalities give the smallest hypercube containing E(Q￿jx).
￿CT
O is the collection of ￿￿ s such that P(yjx) is contained in such hypercube x ￿ a:s: The more
E(Q￿jx) di⁄ers from the hypercubes used by ABJ and CT, the more likely it is that a candidate
value ￿ belongs to ￿ABJ
O and ￿CT
O ; but not to ￿I: A graphical intuition for this relationship is
given in Figure 2.
3.4 Two Player Entry Game ￿An Implementation
This section presents an implementation of our method, and a series of numerical illustrations of
the identi￿cation gains that it a⁄ords, in the two player entry game in Example 3.1, both with and
without covariates in the payo⁄ functions. The set S￿ for this example (omitting x) is plotted in
Figure 1. Appendix A.4 provides details on the method used to compute ￿ABJ
O ; ￿CT
O and ￿I:
For all the data generating processes (DGPs) we let ("1;"2)
iid ￿ N (0;1). The DGPs with-
out covariates are designed as follows. We build a grid of 36 equally spaced values for ￿?
1;￿?
2
on [￿1:8;￿0:8] ￿ [￿1:7;￿0:7], yielding multiple equilibria with a probability that ranges from
substantial (0.21), to small (0.07). We match each point on the ￿?
1;￿?
2 grid, with each point
on a grid of 10 values for ￿?; the probability distribution over equilibria in the region of mul-
tiplicity.20 This results in 360 distinct DGPs, each with a corresponding vector [P(y = t); t 2
f(0;0);(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g]: We compute ￿I; ￿CT
O and ￿ABJ
O for each DGP, letting the parameter
space be ￿ = [￿4:995;￿0:005]





where Proj(￿ji) is the projection of the set in parentheses on dimension i; and L(Proj(￿ji)) is the
length of such projection. To conserve space, in Table 1 we report only the results of our ￿top
15% reduction,￿￿median reduction,￿and ￿bottom 15% reduction.￿ 21 Figure 3 plots ￿I; ￿CT
O and
￿ABJ
O for each of these DGPs.
20The grid on ￿
? is constructed by letting ￿
? ((0;1)) take values 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, ￿
? ((1;0)) take values in
[0;0:75 ￿ ￿








= 1 ￿ ￿
? ((0;1)) ￿ ￿
? ((1;0)).
21The full set of results is available from the authors upon request. Our best result has a 97% reduction in size of
￿I compared to ￿
CT
O : Our worst result has a 20% reduction in size of ￿I compared to ￿
CT
O : Only 6% of the DGPs
yield a reduction in size of ￿I compared to ￿
CT
O of less than 25%.
18To further illustrate the computational feasibility of our methodology, we allow for covari-
ates in the payo⁄ functions. Speci￿cally, we let ￿j = yj
￿
y￿j￿j + ￿0j + x1j￿1j + x2j￿2j + "j
￿
;
j = 1;2; where [x11 x21]; the covariates for player 1, take four di⁄erent values, f[￿2 1];[1
￿1:5];[0 0:75];[￿1:5 ￿1]g and [x12 x22]; the covariates for player 2, take ￿ve di⁄erent values,
f[1 ￿1:75];[￿1:25 1];[0 0];[0:6 0:5];[0:5 ￿0:5]g. The parameter vector of interest is ￿ = [(￿j ￿0j
￿1j ￿2j)j=1;2]: In generating P(yjx); we use the values of ￿? and ￿?
1;￿?
2 which yield the ￿top 15%
reduction,￿￿median reduction,￿and ￿bottom 15% reduction￿in the DGPs with no x variables,
and pair them with [￿?
01 ￿?
11 ￿?
21] = [0 1=2 1=3] and [￿?
02 ￿?
12 ￿?
22] = [0 ￿1=3 ￿1=2]: This results
in three di⁄erent DGPs. Compared to the case with no covariates, for each of these DGPs the
computational time required to verify whether a candidate ￿ is in ￿I is linear in the number of
values that x can take. The reductions in size of ￿I compared to the outer regions of ABJ and CT
is of similar magnitude to the case with no covariates. Table 2 reports the results.
4 Application II: Entry Games of Incomplete Information
We now consider the case that players have incomplete information (see, e.g. Aradillas-L￿pez
(2010), Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007), Seim (2006), Sweeting (2009)). We retain the notation
introduced in Section 3, but we substitute Assumption 3.1 with the following one, which is fairly
standard in the literature.22 We continue to maintain Assumption 3.2.
Assumption 4.1 (i) The set of outcomes of the game Y is ￿nite. The observed outcome of the
game results from simultaneous move, pure strategy Bayesian Nash play.
(ii) All players and the researcher observe payo⁄ shifters xj; j = 1;:::;J: The payo⁄ shifter "j
is private information to player j = 1;:::;J; and unobservable to the researcher. Conditional on
fxj;j = 1;:::;Jg; "j is independent of f"igi6=j : Players have correct common prior F￿ ("jx):
(iii) The payo⁄s are additively separable in " : ￿j (yj;y￿j;xj;"j;￿) = ~ ￿j (yj;y￿j;xj;￿) + "j: As-
sumption 3.1-(iii) holds.
For the sake of brevity, we restrict attention to two player entry games. However, this restriction
is not necessary. Our results easily extend, with appropriate modi￿cations to the notation and the
de￿nition of the set of pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE), to the case of J ￿ 2 players
each with 2 ￿ ￿Yj < 1 strategies. In what follows, we characterize the set of BNE of the game,
22The independence condition in Assumption 4.1-(iii) substantially simpli￿es the task of calculating the set of BNE.
Conceptually, however, our methodology applies also when players￿types are correlated. The resulting di¢ culties
associated with calculating the set of BNE are to be faced with any methodology for inference in this class of games.
The correct-common-prior condition in Assumption 4.1-(iii) can be relaxed, but we maintain it here for simplicity.
19borrowing from the treatment in Grieco (2009, Section 4), and then apply our methodology to this
set.23 To conserve space, we do not explicitly verify Assumptions 2.1-2.5. Assumptions 2.1-2.3
follow by similar arguments as in Section 3. Assumptions 2.4-2.5 follow by the same construction
that we provide at the end of Section 3, replacing equation (3.7) with equation (8) in Grieco (2009,
Theorem 4).
With incomplete information, players￿strategies are decision rules yj : E ! f0;1g; with E
the support of ". The set of outcomes of the game is Y = f(0;0);(1;0);(0;1);(1;1)g: Given
￿ 2 ￿ and a realization of x and "j; player j enters the market if and only if his expected payo⁄
is non-negative. Therefore, equilibrium mappings (decision rules) are step functions determined
by a threshold: yj ("j) = 1("j ￿ tj); j = 1;2: As a result, player j￿ s beliefs about player ￿j￿ s
probability of entry under the common prior assumption is
R
y￿j ("￿j)dF￿ ("￿jjx) = 1￿F￿ (t￿jjx);
and therefore player j￿ s best response cuto⁄ is24
tb
j (t￿j;x;￿) = ￿~ ￿j (1;0;xj;￿)F￿ (t￿jjx) ￿ ~ ￿j (1;1;xj;￿)(1 ￿ F￿ (t￿jjx)):
Hence, the set of equilibria can be de￿ned as the set of cuto⁄ rules:
T￿ (x) =
n
(t1;t2) : tj = tb
j (t￿j;x;￿) 8 j = 1;2
o
:
Note that the equilibrium thresholds are functions of x only. The set T￿ (x) might contain a ￿nite
number of equilibria (e.g., if the common prior is the Normal distribution), or a continuum of
equilibria. For ease of notation we write the set T￿ (x) and its realizations, respectively, as T￿ and
T￿ (!) ￿ T￿ (x(!)); ! 2 ￿:
For given realization of the random variables characterizing the model, i.e., for given ! 2 ￿;
we need to map the set of equilibrium decision rules of each player, into outcomes of the game.
Consider the realization t(!) of t 2 Sel(T￿): Through the threshold decision rule, such realization






1("1 (!) ￿ t1 (!);"2 (!) ￿ t2 (!))
1("1 (!) ￿ t1 (!);"2 (!) ￿ t2 (!))
1("1 (!) ￿ t1 (!);"2 (!) ￿ t2 (!))





with ￿3 the simplex in <4: The vector q (t(!)) indicates which of the four possible pairs of actions
is played with probability 1, when the realization of (x;") is (x(!);"(!)) and the equilibrium
23We refer to Grieco (2009) for a thorough discussion of the related literature and of identi￿cation problems in
games of incomplete information with multiple BNE. See also Berry and Tamer (2007, Section 3).
24For example, with payo⁄s linear in x and given by ￿(yj;y￿j;x;"j;￿) = yj (y￿j￿1j + xj￿2j + "j), we have that
player 1 enters if and only if ("1 + x1￿21)F￿ (t2jx) + ("1 + x1￿21 + ￿11)(1 ￿ F￿ (t2jx)) ￿ 0: Therefore the cuto⁄ is
t
b
j (t￿j;x;￿) = ￿x1￿21F￿ (t2jx) ￿ (x1￿21 + ￿11)(1 ￿ F￿ (t2jx)) = ￿x1￿21 ￿ ￿11 (1 ￿ F￿ (t2jx)):
20threshold is t(!) 2 T￿ (x(!)). Applying this construction to all measurable selections of T￿; we
construct a random closed set in ￿3 :
Q￿ = fq (t) : t 2 Sel(T￿)g:
For given x and ￿ 2 ￿; de￿ne the conditional Aumann expectation
E(Q￿jx) = fE(q (t)jx) : t 2 Sel(T￿)g:
Notice that for a speci￿c selection t 2 Sel(T￿); given the independence assumption on "1;"2; the
￿rst entry of the vector E(q (t)jx) is
E(1("1 ￿ t1;"2 ￿ t2)jx) = (1 ￿ F￿ (t1jx))(1 ￿ F￿ (t2jx));
and similarly for the other entries of E(q (t)jx): This yields the multinomial distribution over
outcome pro￿les determined by equilibrium threshold t 2 Sel(T￿). By the same logic as in Section
3, E(Q￿jx) is the set of probability distributions over action pro￿les conditional on x which are
consistent with the maintained modeling assumptions, i.e., with all the model￿ s implications. By
the same results that we applied in Section 3, the set E(Q￿jx) is closed and convex.
Observe that regardless of whether T￿ contains a ￿nite number of equilibria or a continuum,
Q￿ can take on only a ￿nite number of realizations,25 corresponding to each of the vertices of ￿3.
As we show in the proof of Theorem 4.1, this implies that E(Q￿jx) is a closed convex polytope
x￿a:s:, fully characterized by a ￿nite number of supporting hyperplanes. In turn, this allows us to
characterize ￿I through a ￿nite number of moment inequalities, and to compute it using e¢ cient
algorithms in linear programming.
Theorem 4.1 Let Assumptions 4.1 and 3.2 hold, and no other information be available. Then
￿I =
￿
















￿0 : ui 2 f0;1g; i = 1;:::;￿Y
o
:
Remark 4.1 Grieco (2009) introduces an important model, where each player has a vector of
payo⁄ shifters unobservable by the researcher. Some of the elements of this vector are private
information to the player, while the others are known to all players. Our results in Section 2 apply
to this set-up as well, by the same arguments as in Section 3 and in this Section.
25Hence, the set Q￿ is a ￿simple￿random closed set in ￿
3, see De￿nition A.4 in Appendix A.
21Remark 4.2 Appendix A.3 veri￿es Andrews and Shi￿ s (2009) regularity conditions for models
satisfying Assumptions 4.1 and 3.2, under the additional assumption that the researcher observes
an i.i.d. sequence of equilibrium outcomes and observable payo⁄ shifters fyi;xig
n
i=1.
5 Application III: Best Linear Prediction with Interval Outcome
and Covariate Data
Here we consider the problem of best linear prediction under square loss, when both outcome and
covariate data are interval valued.26 HMPS studied the related problem of identi￿cation of the
BLP parameters with missing data on outcome and covariates, and provided a characterization of
the identi￿cation region of each component of the vector ￿: While their characterization is sharp,
the computational complexity of the problem in the HMPS formulation grows with the number of
points in the support of the outcome and covariate variables, and becomes essentially unfeasible if
these variables are continuous, unless one discretizes their support quite coarsely. Using the same
approach as in the previous part of the paper, we provide a characterization of ￿I which remains
computationally feasible regardless of the support of outcome and covariate variables.
We let y?;x? denote the unobservable outcome and covariate variables. To simplify the ex-
position, we let x? be scalar, though this assumption can be relaxed and is not essential for our
methodology. We maintain the following assumption:
Assumption 5.1 The researcher does not observe the realizations of (y?;x?); but rather the re-
alizations of real valued random variables yL; yU; xL; xU such that P(yL ￿ y? ￿ yU) = 1 and





are all ￿nite, for each i;j = L;U:
One of the following holds: (i) at least one of yL;yU;xL;xU;y?;x? has a continuous distribution;
or (ii) (￿;F;P) is a non-atomic probability space.27
With respect to the general notation used in Section 2, z = (yL;yU;xL;xU), ￿ = (y?;x?); F is the
￿-algebra generated by (yL;yU;xL;xU;y?;x?): The researcher works with unconditional moments.
Remark 5.1 Under Assumption 5.1, Assumption 2.1 is satis￿ed.
26Beresteanu and Molinari (2008) study identi￿cation and statistical inference for the parameters ￿ 2 ￿ of the
BLP parameters when only the outcome variable is interval valued. See also Bontemps, Magnac, and Maurin (2008)
for related results. Here we signi￿cantly generalize their identi￿cation results by allowing also for interval valued
covariates. This greatly complicates computation of ￿I and inference, because ￿I is no longer a linear transformation
of an Aumann expectation.
27Clearly, case (i) guarantees that (￿;F;P) is non-aotmic.
22When y? and x? are perfectly observed, it is well known that the BLP problem can be expressed
through a linear projection model, where the prediction error associated with the BLP parameters
￿? and given by "? = y? ￿ ￿?
1 ￿ ￿?
2x? satis￿es E("?) = 0 and E("?x?) = 0: For any candidate
￿ 2 ￿; we extend the construction of the prediction error to the case of interval valued data. We
let Y = [yL;yU] and X = [xL;xU]. It is easy to show that these are random closed sets in < as per





y ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2x
(y ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2x)x
￿
: (y;x) 2 Sel(Y ￿ X)
￿
:
This is the not necessarily convex ￿-dependent set of prediction errors and prediction errors multi-
plied by covariate which are implied by the intervals Y and X.
Remark 5.2 The set Q￿ satis￿es Assumption 2.2 by construction. Because it is given by a con-
tinuous map applied to the random closed sets Y and X; Q￿ is a random closed set in <2: By
Assumption 5.1, the set Q￿ is integrably bounded, see Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, proof of
Theorem 4.2). By the Fundamental Selection Theorem (Molchanov (2005, Theorem 1.2.13)) and
by Lemma 2.1, there exist selected predictions  (yL;yU;xL;xU;y?;x?;￿) that satisfy Assumption
2.4. The last step in the proof of Theorem 5.1, given in Appendix A, establishes that Assumption
2.5 holds.
Given the set Q￿; one can relate conceptually our approach in Section 2 to the problem that we
study here, as follows. For a candidate ￿ 2 ￿; each selection (y;x) from the random intervals Y and
X yields a moment for the prediction error " = y ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2x and its product with the covariate x:
The collection of such moments for all (y;x) 2 Sel(Y ￿X) is equal to the (unconditional) Aumann
expectation E(Q￿) = fE(q) : q 2 Sel(Q￿)g: Because the probability space is non-atomic and Q￿
belongs to a ￿nite dimensional space, E(Q￿) is a closed convex set. If E(Q￿) contains the vector
[0 0]
0 as one of its elements, then the candidate value of ￿ is one of the observationally equivalent
parameters of the BLP of y? given x?: This is because if the condition just mentioned is satis￿ed,
then for the candidate ￿ 2 ￿ there exists a selection in Sel(Y ￿ X); that is, a pair of admissible
random variables y and x; which implies a prediction error that has mean zero and is uncorrelated
with x; hence satisfying the requirements for the BLP prediction error.28 This intuition is formalized
in Theorem 5.1.
28Notice that with respect to the general notation used in Section 2, w(z) = [0 0]
0:
23Theorem 5.1 Let Assumption 5.1 hold, and no other information be available. Then
￿I =
￿






￿ 2 ￿ :
R
(E[h(Q￿;u)])￿ dU = 0
￿
:
The support function of Q￿ can be easily calculated. In particular, for any u = [u1 u2]
0 2 B;





u1 (y ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2x) + u2
￿
yx ￿ ￿1x ￿ ￿2x2￿￿
:
For given ￿ 2 ￿ and u 2 B; this maximization problem can be e¢ ciently solved using the gradient
method, regardless of whether (yi;xi)i=L;U ; (y?;x?) are continuous or discrete random variables.
Hence, h(Q￿;u) is an easy to calculate continuous-valued convex sublinear function of u: Member-
ship of a candidate ￿ to the set ￿I can be veri￿ed using e¢ cient algorithms in convex programming,
or taking integrals of concave functions.
Remark 5.3 Appendix A.3 veri￿es Andrews and Shi￿ s (2009) regularity conditions for models
satisfying Assumption 5.1, under the additional assumption that the researcher observes an i.i.d.
sequence fyiL;yiU;xiL;xiUg
n
i=1 and that these have ￿nite fourth moments.
6 Conclusions
This paper introduces a computationally feasible characterization for the sharp identi￿cation region
￿I of the parameters of incomplete econometric models with convex moment predictions. Our
approach is based on characterizing, for each ￿ 2 ￿; the set of moments which are consistent
with all the model￿ s implications, as the (conditional) Aumann expectation of a properly de￿ned
random set. If the model is correctly speci￿ed, one can then build ￿I as follows. A candidate ￿
is in ￿I if and only if it yields a conditional Aumann expectation which, for x ￿ a:s:; contains the
relevant expectations of random variables observed in the data. Because in general, for each ￿ 2 ￿;
the conditional Aumann expectation may have in￿nitely many extreme points, characterizing the
set ￿I entails checking that an in￿nite number of moment inequalities are satis￿ed. However, we
show that this computational hardship can be avoided, and the sharp identi￿cation region can
be characterized as the set of parameter values for which the maximum of an easy-to-compute
superlinear (hence concave) function over the unit ball is equal to zero. We show that ￿nite sample
inference can be carried out adopting the generalized moment selection procedure with in￿nitely
many conditional moment inequalities recently proposed by Andrews and Shi (2009). We exemplify
24our methodology by applying it to empirically relevant models, for which a feasible characterization
of ￿I was absent in the literature.
We acknowledge that the method proposed in this paper may, for some models, be computa-
tionally more intensive than existing methods (e.g., ABJ and CT in the analysis of ￿nite games
of complete information with multiple equilibria). However, advanced computational methods in
convex programming made available in recent years, along with the use of parallel processing, can
substantially alleviate this computational burden. On the other hand, the bene￿ts in terms of
identi￿cation yielded by our methodology may be substantial, as illustrated in our examples.
25A Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Sections 3-5
A.1 De￿nitions
The theory of random closed sets generally applies to the space of closed subsets of a locally compact
Hausdor⁄ second countable topological space F (e.g., Molchanov (2005)). For the purposes of this paper it
su¢ ces to consider F = <d; which simpli￿es the exposition. Denote by F the family of closed subsets of <d:
De￿nition A.1 A map Z : ￿ ! F is called a random closed set, also known as a closed set valued
random variable, if for every compact set K in <d; f! 2 ￿ : Z (!) \ K 6= ;g 2 F:
De￿nition A.2 A random closed set Z : ￿ ! F is called integrably bounded if kZkH = supfkzk : z 2 Zg
has a ￿nite expectation.
De￿nition A.3 Let Z be a random closed set in <d. A random element z with values in <d is called a
(measurable) selection of Z if z(!) 2 Z (!) for almost all ! 2 ￿: The family of all selections of Z is denoted
by Sel(Z):
De￿nition A.4 A random closed set Z in F is called simple if it assumes at most a ￿nite number of
values, so that there exists a ￿nite measurable partition ￿1;:::;￿m of ￿ and sets K1;:::;Km 2 F such that
Z (!) = Ki for all ! 2 ￿i; 1 ￿ i ￿ m:
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. For any given ￿ 2 ￿; if  (z;￿;￿) is a selected prediction, then  (z;￿;￿) is a random
element as a composition of measurable functions, and it belongs to Q￿ for almost all ! 2 ￿ by Assumption
2.4-(i). Conversely, for any given ￿ 2 ￿ let q 2 Sel(Q￿): Because q is F-measurable, by the Doob-Dynkin
Lemma (see, e.g., Rao and Swift (2006, Proposition 3, Chapter 1)) q can be represented as a measurable
function of z and ￿, which is then the selected prediction and satis￿es conditions (i)-(ii) in Assumption 2.4.
This selected prediction can also be obtained using a selection mechanism which picks a prediction equal to
q (!) for each ! 2 ￿:
Proof of Lemma 2.2. For any given ￿ 2 ￿; let ￿ 2 E(Q￿jG): Then by the de￿nition of the
conditional Aumann expectation, there exists a q 2 Sel(Q￿) such that E(qjG) = ￿: By Lemma 2.1 there
exists a   (z;￿;￿) satisfying Assumption 2.4 such that q (!) =   (z (!);￿ (!);￿) for almost all ! 2 ￿; and
therefore ￿ 2 fE( (z;￿;￿)jG) :  (z;￿;￿) satis￿es Assumption 2.4g: A similar argument yields the reverse
conclusion.




f￿ 2 ￿(Y) : ￿j (￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) ￿ ~ ￿j (￿￿j;xj;"j;￿)g;
where ~ ￿j (￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) = sup~ ￿j2￿(Yj) ￿j (~ ￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿): Since ￿j (￿j;￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) is a continuous func-
tion of ￿;xj;"j, its supremum ~ ￿j (￿￿j;xj;"j;￿) is a continuous function. Continuity in xj;"j follows from




























S￿ is the ￿nite intersection of sets de￿ned as solutions of inequalities for continuous (random) functions. Thus,
S￿ is a random closed set, see Molchanov (2005, Section 1.1).
Proof of Proposition 3.3. To see that the expression in equation (3.8) is the outer region proposed
by ABJ, observe that max
￿R
[q (￿)]k dF ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
gives the probability that tk is a possible equi-
librium outcome of the game according to the model. It is obtained by selecting with probability one, in each
region of multiplicity, the mixed strategy pro￿le which yields the highest probability that tk is the outcome
of the game. To see that the expression in equation (3.9) is the outer region proposed by CT, observe that
min
￿R
[q (￿)]k dF ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
gives the probability that tk is the unique equilibrium outcome of the
game according to the model. It is obtained by selecting with probability one, in each region of multiplicity,
the mixed strategy pro￿le which yields the lowest probability that tk is the outcome of the game.
To obtain ￿ABJ
O by solving the maximization problem in equation (3.5) over the restricted set of u￿ s
equal to the canonical basis vectors in <￿Y, take the vector uk 2 <￿Y to have all entries equal to zero except






= uk0P(yjx) ￿ h
￿
E(Q￿jx);uk￿
= max(E([q (￿)]kjx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)):
To obtain ￿CT
O by solving the maximization problem in equation (3.5) over the restricted set of u￿ s equal to
the canonical basis vectors in <￿Y and each of these vectors multiplied by ￿1, observe that the statement
for the upper bound follows by the argument given above when considering ￿ABJ
O : To verify the statement
for the lower bound, take the vector ￿uk 2 <￿Y to have all entries equal to zero except entry k which is

















[q (￿)]k dF ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
:




y = tk￿ ￿x
￿










[q (￿)]k dF ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
= 1 ￿ min
￿R
[q (￿)]k dF ("jx) : ￿ 2 Sel(S￿)
￿
:
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.1,
￿I = f￿ 2 ￿ : P(yjx) 2 E(Q￿jx); x ￿ a:s:g
=
￿
￿ 2 ￿ : max
u2B
(u0P(yjx) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jx]) = 0 x ￿ a:s:
￿
= f￿ 2 ￿ : u0P(yjx) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jx] 8 u 2 B; x ￿ a:s:g
27It remains to show equivalence of the conditions
(i) u0P(yjx) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jx] 8u 2 B
(ii) u0P(yjx) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jx] 8u 2 D:
By the positive homogeneity of the support function, condition (i) is equivalent to u0P(yjx) ￿ E[h(Q￿;u)jx]
8u 2 <￿Y: It is obvious that this condition implies condition (ii). To see why condition (ii) implies condition
(i), observe that because the set Q￿ and the set co[Q￿] are simple, one can ￿nd a ￿nite measurable partition
￿1;:::;￿m of ￿ and convex sets K1;:::;Km 2 ￿￿Y￿1, such that by Theorem 2.1.21 in Molchanov (2005)
E(Q￿jx) = K1P(￿1jx) ￿ K2P(￿2jx) ￿ ::: ￿ KmP(￿mjx);
with Ki the value that co[Q￿ (!)] takes for ! 2 ￿i; i = 1;:::;m (see De￿nition A.4). By the properties of





Finally, for each i = 1;:::;m; the vertices of Ki are a subset of the vertices of ￿￿Y￿1. Hence the supporting
hyperplanes of Ki; i = 1;:::;m; are a subset of the supporting hyperplanes of the simplex ￿￿Y￿1; which
in turn are obtained through its support function evaluated in directions u 2 D: Therefore the supporting
hyperplanes of E(Q￿jx) are a subset of the supporting hyperplanes of ￿￿Y￿1:
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It follows from our discussion in Section 2 that minu2B E[h(Q￿;u)] = 0 if
and only if 0 ￿ h(E(Q￿);u) 8 u 2 B; which in turn holds if and only if [0 0]
0 2 E(Q￿): By the de￿nition
of the Aumann expectation, this holds if and only if 9 q 2 Sel(Q￿) : E(q) = [0 0]
0 : This is equivalent to
saying that a candidate ￿ belongs to ￿I if and only if 9 (y;x) 2 Sel(Y ￿ X) which yields, together with
￿; a prediction error " = y ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2x such that E(") = 0 and E("x) = 0: By Theorem 2.1 in Artstein
(1983) and Lemma A.2 in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2010a), (y;x) 2 Sel(Y ￿ X) if and only
if P((y;x) 2 K ￿ L) ￿ P((Y ￿ X) ￿ K ￿ L) = P(yL > inf K;yU < supK;xL > inf L;xU < supL) for all
compact intervals K;L ￿ <: Hence, the above condition is equivalent to being able to ￿nd a pair of random
variables (y;x) with a joint distribution P(y;x) that belongs to the (sharp) identi￿cation region of P(y?;x?)
as de￿ned by Manski (2003, Chapter 3), such that ￿ = argmin#2￿
R
(y￿#1￿#2x)2dP(y;x): It then follows
that the set ￿I is equivalent to the sharp identi￿cation region characterized by Manski (2003, Complement
3B, pp. 56-58). The previous step and Lemma 2.1 also verify Assumption 2.5
A.3 Applicability of Andrews and Shi￿ s (2009) GMS Procedure29
A.3.1 Finite Games of Complete and Incomplete Information
AS (Section 9) consider conditional moment inequality problems of the form E(md (y;x;￿;u)jx) ￿ 0 8u 2 B
x￿a:s:; d = 1;:::;D: They show that the conditional moment inequalities can be transformed into equivalent
unconditional moment inequalities, by choosing appropriate weighting functions (instruments) g 2 G; with
G a collection of instruments and g that depend on x: This yields E(md (y;x;￿;g;u)) ￿ 0; 8u 2 B; 8g =
29We are grateful to Xiaoxia Shi for several discussions that helped us develop this Section.
28[g1;:::;gD]0 2 G; d = 1;:::;D; where md (y;x;￿;g;u) = md (y;x;￿;u)g (x): In the models that we analyze in
Sections 3-4, the conditional moment inequalities are of the ￿ ￿ ￿type, and


















Notice that E[h(Q￿;u)jx] is a known (or simulated) function of ￿; u and x; and that for each u 2 B; we
have only one inequality. Notice also that by the positive homogeneity of the support function, our moment
inequalities can be written equivalently as E(m(y;x;￿;g;u)) ￿ 0; 8g 2 G; 8u 2 S ￿ fu 2 <￿Y : kuk = 1g:
Hence, they are invariant to rescaling of the moment function, which is important for ￿nite sample inference
(see, e.g., Andrews and Soares (2010)).
In all that follows, to simplify the exposition, we abstract from the choice of G: Once we establish that
our problem ￿ts into the general framework of AS, one can choose instruments g as detailed in Section






; k = 1;:::;￿Y
￿
: We ￿rst
establish that ￿I can be equivalently de￿ned using only the ￿rst ￿Y ￿ 1 entries of Y; thereby avoiding the
problems for inference associated with linear dependence among the entries of F (yjx) and also lowering the
dimension over which the maximization is performed. Let e F (yjx) denote the ￿rst ￿Y ￿ 1 rows of F (yjx),
B￿Y￿1 = fu 2 <￿Y￿1 : kuk ￿ 1g, S￿Y￿1 = fu 2 <￿Y￿1 : kuk = 1g, and
~ Q￿ = f~ q = [[q (￿)]k ; k = 1;:::;￿Y ￿ 1]; q 2 Sel(Q￿)g:
Theorem A.1 Let Assumptions 3.1 (or 4.1) and 3.2 hold, and no other information be available. Then
~ ￿I ￿
￿



































Proof. The equality between equations (A.1) and (A.2) follows by standard arguments, see, e.g.,
Beresteanu and Molinari (2008, Lemma A.1). To establish that ~ ￿I = ￿I, observe that ￿ 2 ~ ￿I if and




. Pick ￿ 2 ￿I: Then there exists a q 2 Sel(Q￿) : F (yjx) = E(qjx): Notice




; hence, ￿ 2 ~ ￿I: Conversely, pick ￿ 2 ~ ￿I: Then there











F (yjx) = E(qjx): Hence, ￿ 2 ￿I:
AS propose a con￿dence set with nominal value 1 ￿ ￿ for the true parameter vector, as follows:
CSn = f￿ 2 ￿ : Tn (￿) ￿ cn;1￿￿ (￿)g;
where Tn (￿) is a test statistic and cn;1￿￿ (￿) is a corresponding critical value for a test with nominal sig-
ni￿cance level ￿: AS establish that, under certain assumptions, this con￿dence set has correct uniform
asymptotic size. In order to apply the construction in AS, we maintain the following:
29Assumption A.1 The researcher observes an i.i.d. sequence of equilibrium outcomes and observable payo⁄
shifters fyi;xig
n




￿ e F (yjx) e F (yjx)








￿ ￿ is a matrix norm for ~ ￿x compatible with
the Euclidean norm.
AS propose various criterion functions Tn; some of the CramØr-von Mises type, some of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov type. Here, we work with a mix of CramØr-von Mises and Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, using a



























where ￿ denotes a probability measure on G whose support is G as detailed in Section 3 of AS, the second
equality follows from the proof of Theorem A.1, and




i=1 (u0w(yi) ￿ f (xi;￿;u))g (xi);













; k = 1;:::;￿Y ￿ 1
￿
;
so that ￿ mn (￿;g;u) is the sample analog of a version of E(m(y;x;￿;g;u)) which is based on the ￿rst ￿Y ￿1
entries of Y and on ~ Q￿. Note that by the same argument which follows, our problem speci￿ed as in equation
(3.6) corresponds to the CramØr-von Mises test statistic of AS, with modi￿ed function S1.
We conclude by showing that our modi￿ed function S1 satis￿es Assumptions S1-S4 of AS, and that
Assumption M2 of AS is also satis￿ed. This establishes that their generalized moment selection procedure
with in￿nitely many conditional moment inequalities is applicable. We note that one can take the con￿-
dence set CSn applied with con￿dence level 1=2 to obtain half-median-unbiased estimated sets, see AS and
Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009). Finally, one can also take equation (A.1), replace there e F(yjx) with
its sample analog, and construct an Hausdor⁄-consistent estimator of ￿I using the methodology proposed
by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007, equation 3.2 and Theorem 3.1).30
Theorem A.2 Let Assumption A.1 hold. Then Assumptions S1-S4 and M2 of AS are satis￿ed.
30Assume that the payo⁄ functions are continuous in ￿: Then the Nash equilibrium correspondence has a closed
graph, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 1.3.2). This implies that Q￿ has a closed graph, and therefore the


































dFx; with Fx the probability distribution of x (or a probability































Conditions (c-e) in Assumption C1 of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) are veri￿ed by standard arguments.
30Proof. Assumption S1-a follows because the moment inequalities are de￿ned for u 2 S￿Y￿1; hence any
rescaling of the moment function is absorbed by a corresponding rescaling in u: The rest of Assumption S1
and Assumptions S2-S4 are veri￿ed by AS. To verify Assumption M2, observe that
e m(y;x;￿;u) ￿ u0w(y) ￿ f (x;￿;u)
is given by the sum of a linear function of u and a Lipschitz function of u; with Lipschitz constant equal to
1. It is immediate that the processes fu0w(yin); u 2 S￿Y￿1; i ￿ n; n ￿ 1g satisfy Assumption M2. We now
show that the same holds for the processes ff (xin;￿n;u); u 2 S￿Y￿1; i ￿ n; n ￿ 1g: Assumption M2-(a)


































￿ ￿ ￿ cE
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￿ c x ￿ a:s:;
where the ￿rst inequality follows from the variance decomposition formula, c is a constant that depends
on a and b from Assumption A.1, and the last inequality follows recalling that ~ Q￿ takes its realizations in
the unit simplex which is a subset of the unit ball. Assumption M2-(b) follows immediately because the
envelope function is a constant. Assumption M2-(c) is veri￿ed observing that f (x;￿;u) is Lipschitz in u; with
Lipschitz constant equal to 1. By Lemma 2.13 in Pakes and Pollard (1989), the class of functions ff (￿;u);
u 2 S￿Y￿1g is Euclidean with envelope equal to a constant, and therefore manageable. Assumption M2 for
the processes f(u0w(yin) ￿ f (xin;￿n;u)); u 2 S￿Y￿1; i ￿ n; n ￿ 1g then follows by Lemma E1 of AS.
A.3.2 BLP with Interval Outcome and Covariate Data
We maintain the following:























are all ￿nite, for each i;j = L;U:
Let Q￿i be the mapping de￿ned as in equation (5.1) using (yiL;yiU;xiL;xiU): Beresteanu and Molinari (2008,
Lemmas A.4, A.5 and proof of Theorem 4.2) establish that fQ￿ig
n
i=1 is a sequence of i.i.d. random closed







































where, again, the fact that u 2 S guarantees that the above test statistic is invariant to rescaling of the
moment function. This preserves concavity of the objective function. We then have the following result:
Theorem A.3 Let Assumptions 5.1 and A.2 hold. Then Assumption EP on page 37 of AS is satis￿ed.
31Proof. Let m(yiL;yiU;xiL;xiU;￿;u) = h(Q￿i;u): Following AS notation, de￿ne
p


















Given the above de￿nitions, we have
p
n￿ mn (￿;u) = ￿n (￿;u) + ￿1;n (￿;u):
By the Central Limit Theorem for i.i.d. sequences of random sets (Molchanov (2005, Theorem 2.2.1))
￿n (￿;￿) =) ￿￿2(￿) (￿);
a Gaussian process with mean zero, covariance kernel ￿2 (￿;u;u￿); and continuous sample paths. It follows
from the Strong Law of Large Numbers in Banach spaces of Mourier (1955) that the sample analog estimator
^ ￿2;n (￿;u;u￿) which replaces population moments with sample averages, satis￿es ^ ￿2;n (￿;￿;￿) !a:s: ￿2 (￿;￿;￿);
uniformly in u;u￿:
A.4 Computational Aspects of the Problem
In this Section, we focus on games of complete information. The case of games of incomplete information
can be treated analogously, and we refer to Grieco (2009) for a thorough discussion of how to compute the
set of Bayesian Nash equilibria. The case of BLP with interval data is straightforward.
When computing ￿I (or ￿ABJ
O and ￿CT
O ), one faces three challenging tasks. We describe them here, and
note how each task is a⁄ected by the number of players, the number of strategy pro￿les, and the presence of
covariates in the payo⁄ functions. For comparison purposes, we also discuss the di⁄erences in computational
costs associated with our methodology, versus those associated with ABJ￿ s and CT￿ s methodology.
The ￿rst step in the procedure requires one to compute the set of all MSNE for given realizations of the
payo⁄shifters, S￿ (x;"): This is a computationally challenging problem, though a well studied one which can
be performed using the Gambit software described by McKelvey and McLennan (1996).31 The complexity
of this task grows quickly with the number of players and the number of actions that each player can choose
from. Notice, however, that this step has to be performed regardless of which features of normal form games
are identi￿ed: whether su¢ cient conditions are imposed for point identi￿cation of the parameter vector of
interest, as in Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2009), or this vector is restricted to lie in an outer region, or its sharp
identi￿cation region is characterized through the methodology proposed in this paper. For example, Bajari,
Hong, and Ryan (2009) work with an empirical application which has a very large number of players, but
31The Gambit software can be freely downloaded at http://gambit.sourceforge.net/. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2009)
recommend the use of this software to compute the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in ￿nite normal form games.
32group the smaller ones together in order to reduce the number of players to 4. Similarly, application of our
method to games with multiple mixed strategies Nash equilibria requires a limited number of players.32
The second task involves verifying whether a candidate ￿ 2 ￿ is in the region of interest. The di¢ culty
of this task varies depending on whether one wants to check that ￿ 2 ￿I; or that ￿ 2 ￿ABJ
O or ￿ 2 ￿CT
O .
As established in Proposition 3.3, in all cases one needs to work with E[h(Q￿;u)jx]; so we ￿rst describe,
for a given u 2 <￿Y; how to obtain this quantity by simulation (see, e.g., McFadden (1989) and Pakes and























where u0 = [u1u2 :::u￿Y] and Y =
￿
t1;:::;t￿Y￿
is the set of possible outcomes of the game. One can
simulate this multidimensional integral using the following procedure.33 Let X denote the support of x:
For any x 2 X; draw realizations of ", denoted "r; r = 1;:::;R; according to the distribution F ("jx)
with identity covariance matrix. These draws stay ￿xed throughout the remaining steps. Transform the






, j = 1;:::;J; and obtain the set S￿ (x;"r): Then compute the set Q￿ (x;"r) as the set
of multinomial distributions over outcome pro￿les implied by each element of S￿ (x;"r): Pick a u 2 <￿Y;
compute the support function h(Q￿ (x;"r);u); and average it over a large number of draws of "r: Call the
resulting average ^ ER [h(Q￿;u)jx]: Note that because each summand is a function of "r and these are i.i.d.





Having obtained ^ ER [h(Q￿;u)jx], in order to verify whether ￿ 2 ￿ABJ
O and ￿ 2 ￿CT
O ; it su¢ ces to
verify conditional moment inequalities involving, respectively, ￿Y and 2￿Y evaluations of ^ ER [h(Q￿;u)jx],
corresponding to the choices of u detailed in Proposition 3.3. As illustrated in our examples, however, using
only these inequalities may lead to outer regions which are much larger than ￿I. Verifying whether ￿ 2
￿I using the method described in this paper involves solving maxu2B
￿Y ￿1
￿








and checking if the resulting value function is equal to zero, for each value of x: We emphasize that the
dimensionality of u does not depend in any way on the number of equilibria of the game (just on the number









before, for given x 2 X, the criterion function to be maximized is concave, and the maximization occurs
over a convex subset of <￿Y￿1. In a two player entry game with payo⁄s linear in x, we have experienced
that e¢ cient algorithms in convex programming, such as the CVX software for MatLab (Grant and Boyd
(2010)), can solve this maximization problem with a handful of iterations, in the order of 10-25 depending on
the candidate ￿. We have also experienced that a simple Nelder-Mead algorithm programmed in Fortran 90
works very well, yielding the usual speed advantages of Fortran over MatLab. For each parameter candidate,
the above maximization problem needs to be solved for each possible value of x 2 X when x is discrete and
for each g 2 G when applying AS procedure,34 and checking whether all required conditions are satis￿ed.
32On the other hand, our method is applicable to models with a larger set of players, when players are restricted
to playing pure strategies, or the game is one of incomplete information.
33The procedure described here is very similar to the one proposed by Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). When the
assumptions maintained by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2009, Section 3) are satis￿ed, their algorithm can be used to
signi￿cantly reduce the computational burden associated with simulating the integral.
34AS show that in practice, the integral over G can be replaced by a ￿nite sum, see their Section 3.5.
33Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the computational burden of this stage is linear in the number of
values that x (respectively, g) takes.
Finally, the region of interest needs to be computed. This means that the researcher should search over
the parameter space ￿ and collect all the points in ￿I or ￿CT
O or ￿ABJ
O . This is of course a theoretical
set and in practice the researcher seeks to collect enough points that belong to the region of interest, such
that it can be covered reasonably well. While easy to program, a grid search over ￿ is highly ine¢ cient,
especially when ￿ belongs to a high-dimensional space. CT propose to search over ￿ using a method based
on Simulated Annealing. In this paper we use an alternative algorithm called Di⁄erential Evolution. We
give here a short description of this method focusing mainly on its complexity. We refer to Price, Storn,
and Lampinen (2004) for further details. Di⁄erential Evolution (DE) is a type of Genetic Algorithm that
is often used to solve optimization problems. The algorithm starts from a population of Np points picked
randomly from the set ￿. It then updates this list of points at each stage, creating a new generation of Np
points to replace the previous one. A candidate to replace a current member of the population (child) is
created by combining information from members of the current population (parents). This new candidate
is accepted to the population as a replacement to a current member if it satis￿es a certain criterion. In
our application, the criterion for being admitted into the new generation is to be a member of ￿I (or ￿CT
O
or ￿ABJ
O ; when computing each of these regions). The process of ￿nding a replacement for each of the
current Np points is repeated N times, yielding N ￿Np maximizations of the criterion function (respectively,
evaluation of the conditional inequalities for CT and ABJ). During this process we record the points which
were found to belong to the regions of interest. In our simulations, we experienced that this method explores
￿ in a very e¢ cient way. Price, Storn, and Lampinen (2004) recommend for Np to grow linearly with the
dimensionality of ￿. The number of iterations (generations) N depends on how well one wants to cover the
region of interest. For example, in a two player entry game with ￿ ￿ <4, we have found that setting Np = 40
and N = 1000 gave satisfactory results, and when N was increased to 5000 the regions of interest seemed
to be very well covered, while the projections on each component of ￿ remained very similar to what we
obtained with N = 1000. Creating candidates to replace members of the population involve trivial algebraic
operations whose number grows linearly with the dimensionality of ￿. These operations involve picking two
tuning parameters, but satisfactory rules of thumb exist in the literature, see Price, Storn, and Lampinen
(2004).
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38B Tables and Figures
Table 1: Projections of ￿ABJ
O ; ￿CT
O and ￿I, reduction in bounds width compared to CT, and
reduction in area of ￿I compared to ￿CT
O . Results reported are "top 15 percent," "median," and
"bottom 15 percent" reduction in the sum of length of sharp bounds on ￿1 and ￿2 compared to the
sum of length of outer bounds of CT. Two player entry game with mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
as solution concept.
True Values1 Projections of: % Width % Region
￿ABJ
O ￿CT
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40Figure 1: Two player entry game. Panel (a): The random set of mixed strategy NE pro￿les, S￿; as
a function of "1,"2. Panel (b): The random set of probability distributions over outcome pro￿les
implied by mixed strategy NE, Q￿, as a function of "1,"2. Panel (c): The support function in
direction u of the random set of probability distributions over outcome pro￿les implied by mixed





















Qθ = {{(0,1,0,0)}, q(-ε2/θ2,-ε1/θ1), {(0,0,1,0)}}





41Figure 2: A comparison between the logic behind the approaches of ABJ, CT, and this paper,
obtained by projecting in <2 : ￿￿Y￿1; E(Q￿jx); and the hypercubes used by ABJ and CT. A
candidate ￿ 2 ￿ is in ￿I if P(yjx), the white dot in the picture, belongs to the black ellipses
E(Q￿jx); which gives the set of probability distributions consistent with all the model￿ s implica-
tions. The same ￿ is in ￿CT
O if P(yjx) belongs to the red region or to the black ellipses, which
give the set of probability distributions consistent with the subset of model￿ s implications used by
CT. The same ￿ is in ￿ABJ
O if P(yjx) belongs to the yellow region or to the red region or to the
black ellipses, which give the set of probability distributions consistent with the subset of model￿ s
implications used by ABJ.
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